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ABSTRACT: Models  of  “Western ontology” often  depict  the  Euro-American world  in  a
stereotypical way that does not seem to have much to do with empirical reality. The aim
of this article is to assess the ethnographic soundness of one of these models: natural-
ism (Descola 2013). In Beyond nature and culture, Philippe Descola makes the hypothesis
that Westerners are “naturalists”, namely, that they trace an unbridgeable gap between
the domain of culture, to which they belong, and the “mute and impersonal” domain of
nature. Thus, for alleged naturalists, animals are nothing but machines, devoid of all the
inner qualities typical of the human being. In this paper, I will analyze the relation be-
tween naturalism  and  ethnographic  data  collected  in  Semot, a  small  village  in  the
southern French Pyrenees. Through a focus on human-animal relations in the contexts
of hunting and herding, it will be shown how naturalism proves to be a rather inade-
quate model to account for the ways animals are represented in Semot.
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Introduction: Ontologically Branded
Over the last two decades, much ink has been spilled on the “ontological
turn” in anthropology1. Therefore, to aggregate this turn into a unitary theo-
retical current remains a gruelling and possibly hopeless task, as there are
significant differences amongst the scholars associated with it2. However, if
one wanted to search for common traits, he would, in all likelihood, find at
least two. The first would be the desire to develop an anthropology that is
not be bound to the nature-culture dualism; and the second would be the
tendency of doing this in constant reference to the “Western world”. 
Indeed, many ontologically bent treatises on the ontology of non-Western
peoples often entail a more or less explicit reference to an “ontology” of the
Western  world  (usually  equated  with  Euro-American  culture).  Variously
called «mononaturalism» (Viveiros de Castro 1998), «building perspective»
(Ingold 2000) or «naturalism» (Descola 2013), this western ontology becomes
the unit of measurement against which to calculate the Other’s “otherness”
(Scott 2013: 862; Vigh, Sausdal 2014: 69). 
Nothing is wrong in adhering to a comparative process of this kind, pro-
vided that there is a symmetry between the two terms of comparison; that is,
comparing «embodied practice in one society with concepts or theories in
another» should be avoided (Lambek 1998: 105; cf. Fortier 2013: 115). Never-
theless, most of the times, hunting practices, shamanic ceremonies or oracu-
lar divinations of far-away people are placed on the same level with philo-
sophical speculations of Western thought. Specifically, it is with the distinc-
1. I would like to express my gratitude to Wiktor Stoczkowski, under whose supervision I
wrote the dissertation at the basis of this article. His reliability, scientific rigour and insights
into the history of anthropology make him a central presence in my training as a researcher.
I  would  also  like  to  thank  Severino  Antonelli,  Charles  Beach, Francesco  Fanoli,  Martin
Fortier, Abraham Heinemann, Simone Leotta, Eleonora Musella and Letizia Nardi for reading
and commenting on previous versions of this paper. Ultimately, I wish to thank the three
anonymous reviewers of Anuac for their helpful comments, critiques and corrections. 
2. The authors  associated with the “turn”, beside having different  research objects  (e.g.
Henare, Holbraad, Wastell 2007; Holbraad 2012; Pedersen 2011; Scott 2007), make no secret
of their  divergent opinions and critical  views on each other’s work (e.g. Descola, Ingold
2014; Ingold 2016; Latour 2009; Scott 2013). 
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tion between res extensa and res cogitans of René Descartes that non-Western
practices are compared, in a perspective where the western world as a whole
is cartesianly conceived3. 
Thus, contrary  to the  ontologies  of  non-Western people  to which it  is
compared, Western ontology is rarely described ethnographically. This asym-
metry is patent in those studies concerning human-animal relations, a privi-
leged field of ontologically bent research4. Here, indigenous conceptions of
animals are usually envisaged in opposition to Western conceptions: “them”
considering animals to be “human persons”, “us”, ontologically branded as
Cartesians, treating them as nothing more than machines (cf. Boglioli 2009:
45-48 ; Morris 2000: 34)5. 
In  this  article, I  shall  provide  an  ethnographic  test  of  the  ontological
model  of  “naturalism” through  the  study  of  human-animal  relations  in
southern France. My aim is to explore whether naturalism, the term by which
Philippe Descola (2013) refers to the ontology of the Western world, is a use-
ful tool to account for how the hunters and breeders of Semot, a Pyrenean
village where I conducted fieldwork in 2014, represent animals. Using natu-
ralism as a benchmark for analysis is a forced choice: Descola is the only an-
thropologist who, among his ontologically bent colleagues, outlines the fea-
tures of the “Western ontology” in detail, thus providing us with concrete
material to work with. 
The task on which I embark is guided by the conviction that, if one really
has to craft them, anthropological models (like naturalism) should be able to
«mirror identifiable processes that can be shown to take place among the
phenomena they seek to depict» (Barth 1987: 8). 
Indeed, a plea for a more careful ethnographic commitment has been re-
peatedly launched by many renowned scholars who have critically addressed
Philippe Descola’s work (e.g. Digard 2006: 423-424) and the ontological turn
3. While equating Western ontology to Cartesian philosophy and sanctioning its radical al-
terity from non-western ontologies, some of these “ontological” monographs model non-
western ontologies on the philosophies of thinkers like Heidegger (e.g. Ingold 2000; Willer-
slev 2007) or Deleuze (e.g. Viveiros de Castro 2009). It’s one or the other: either western on-
tology is not Cartesian, either non-western ontologies are not Heideggerian or Deleuzian;
for how could “our” ontology be radically different from “theirs” while at the same time pro-
viding the means to render them intelligible? 
4. See  Ingold  2000;  Kohn  2007;  Smith  1998;  Viveiros  de  Castro  1998;  Willerslev  2007
amongst others. 
5. While  the  tendency  to  essenzialize  the  Western  world  has  been  typical  of  much
anthropological writing and has been amply criticized (Carrier 1992), the ontological turn
seems to have made a point in reviving it (Candea 2016).
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more generally (e.g. Bessire, Bond 2014: 443-444; Graeber 2015: 9-11). Thus,
the  overall  lack  of  ethnographic  material  provided  to  support  models  of
“Western ontologies”, calls for a return “on the field” that could integrate,
disprove or correct them (cf. Candea, Alcayna-Stevens 2012). 
After briefly evoking the theories presented in Descola’s  Beyond nature
and culture  (2013) and summarizing the main features of naturalism, I will
present the results of my fieldwork. It will be shown that neither of the two
main assertions on which naturalism is based on adequately account for the
ways animals are represented in a rural context of Western Europe. 
What do we mean when we talk about naturalism? 
In Descola’s oeuvre (2013), naturalism is one out of four ontologies (or
«modes  of  identification»), the  other  three  being  animism, totemism and
analogism. Each of these is the expression of a peculiar, cognitively deter-
mined, way of classifying the things that exist in the world. This classifica-
tion occurs by distributing two features that Descola considers universally
recognised as being constitutive of the human being: its immaterial and its
material-visible qualities, called respectively «interiority» and «physicality».
A given subject will thus belong to one ontology and not to another depend-
ing on whether it infers a similarity or dissimilarity between its interiority
and physicality and those of the things that exist in the world: 














Each of these groups of inferences being predominantly (though not ex-
clusively) made in specific regions of the world at a specific historical time,
contemporary Euro-American world is associated with the naturalist ontol-
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ogy6. In this ontology, predominant in Europe since the seventeenth century,
humans and non-humans7 share the same physicality but are differentiated
by their interiority. In other words, this means that while humans admit to
share  with  non-humans  a  common  physical  composition,  they  think  of
themselves as the only ones endowed with immaterial qualities such as re-
flexive thinking, morality, a soul, language and so on (Descola 2013: 173-
174). Thus, when we talk about naturalism, we refer to an ontological for-
mula (which, for clarity’s sake, is a «system of properties of things that exist
in the world» - Descola 2013: 121) composed of two main assertions: 
1.Humans differentiate from non-humans by virtue of their interiority
2. Humans and non-humans share the same physicality
Since  the  four  ontologies  are  designed  to  symmetrically  invert  each
other’s properties by groups of two, naturalism is the symmetrical opposite
of  animism  (an  ontology  where  physicality  discriminates  between  things
while interiority unites them). It is only in the naturalist ontology that na-
ture, a  «mute  and  impersonal»  ontological  domain, exists  (Descola  2013:
173); and it is on the bedrock of this universal nature that many cultures,
namely the various ways in which the distinctive interiority of human beings
takes shape, develop (Descola 2013: 173-174)8. So far so good. Or at least so
6. Animism is mainly found amongst Native Americans, in Siberia, Papua New Guinea and
Malaysia, whereas totemism is typical of aboriginal Australia as well as of some parts of na-
tive  north  America. Analogism is  instead  found in  a  variety  of  contexts:  China, central
America, western Africa, India, ancient Greece, as well as being the ontology that preceded
the advent of naturalism in Europe (Descola 2013: 122, 274; ch.6, 7, 8, 9). This rigid geo-
graphical (and historical) repartition of ontologies has been subsequently softened by De-
scola, who admitted a common degree of hybridity between ontologies (Descola 2010: 339;
2014a: 261-264; 2014b: 277; Kohn 2009: 144). Moreover, in concluding  Beyond nature and
culture, Descola admits that his ontological system ignores «numerous facets of human ex-
perience» which might not «easily be fitted in with the models» he developed in his book
(Descola 2013: 404).
7. Due to its wide scope, Descola never uses the term “non-human” to refer to everything that
is not human. In the animist and naturalist ontologies, for instance, the term “non-human”
pertains mainly to certain species of animals and plants. 
8. It is worth stressing how, in Descola’s quadripartite system, naturalism holds the ambigu-
ous position of being simultaneously the cause of the problems of anthropology (for it is to
cleanse the discipline from its intrinsic naturalistic bias that  Beyond nature and culture  is
written) and the means through which to solve them (for, as Descola admits - 2013: 303 -, he
proceeds from a naturalist stance) (cf. Fortier 2013: 47-48; Ingold 2016: 301-320). If Beyond
nature and culture was a theatrical play, naturalism would be the antagonist, the co-star and
the director at the same time.
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it seems. For how is this difference of interiorities between humans and ani-
mals (a specific class of non-humans) to be interpreted remains hard to say.
Descola is imprecise on this matter, sometimes taking this difference to be
total (2013: 289, 291, 304, 395), some others seeming to take it to be partial
(2013: 182, 185, 196). It is unclear, in sum, whether in naturalism animals are
endowed with an interiority similar in certain respects to that of humans or
lack an interiority altogether9. 
Furthermore, regardless of this “interiority issue” (which is a crucial one),
what strikes the eye is that naturalism is the only ontology that is not based
on ethnographic evidence. Contrarily to the other three ontologies, whose il-
lustration is sustained by a plethora of ethnographic accounts, the way in
which “naturalists” are supposed to represent animals is based exclusively on
the philosophy of a few authors among which Descartes and Darwin seem to
be the most influential (Descola 2013: 173). The notion of naturalism seems
to be more indebted to philosophical deduction than to empirical inference.
This would not be a problem (leaving aside the fact that it makes Descola’s
ontological  comparison  fundamentally  asymmetric,  since  the  sources  on
which naturalism is based on differ significantly from those underpinning
the other ontologies)10, provided that ethnographic data matches with what
9. Incidentally, the same goes for the animist ontology, where animals’ interiority is some-
times said to be identical (2013: 129, 134-135), and some others to be similar (2013: 129, 233,
235, 342), to that of humans. While nothing forbids this ambiguity to be ethnographically
driven, Descola does not explicitly present it as such, leaving his readers to suspect for a lex-
ical confusion rather than for an ethnographic relevance. This ambiguity is also found in
some previous publications (e.g. Descola 1999: 23, 27-28). 
10. In a recent publication (Descola 2014a), Descola defends such choice as follows: «There
is a big difference, in effect, between ritual systems, hunting practices or kinship relations
on one side, and, on the other, scholarly expressions of thought such as philosophy, theology
or law. But actually, I have decided to proceed this way in order to compensate the discrep-
ancy that there is between the relationship we have with our own traditions of thought and
those of others. […]. If I had to speak of Achuar animism and render a purely Achuar point of
view, I should content myself  with presenting songs, magic incantations and dreams, all
kinds of things that, without interpretative mediation, do not mean anything to people who
are not used to such discursive registers. [...]. Thus, since I was already speaking of Africa,
Australia, the Amazon, North America or Melanesia using texts formulated in terms of West-
ern thought, I had to place myself on the same level to present our own ontology. In other
words, I had to grasp it in terms of the reflexivity produced by philosophy, by the history of
ideas, by the history of sciences or by literary essays» (Descola 2014a: 282-283, my transla-
tion). This explanation fails to elucidate why Descola has not recurred to ethnographies on
human-animal  relations  in Europe or  the USA. For  a  more detailed  critique see Fortier
(2013: 115).
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Descola supposes. But this is not the case. Folklore and the anthropology of
human-animal relations in Europe report many cases that do not fall within
the  frame  of  naturalism  (Chevallier  1987;  Dalla  Bernardina  1994;  Lizet,
Ravis-Giordani 1995; Sébillot 1984; Stoczkowski 2003).
The  ensemble of these matters causes questions such as those posed by
Candea and Alcayna-Stevens, who wonder whether anthropology «can […]
take naturalism seriously as an ethnographic object» (2012: 37), or, I would
add, as an analytical category, to impose themselves to whomever is inter-
ested in European ethnography or human-animal relations. In the following
pages, I will try to provide an answer to these questions. 
The ethnographic context 
The  material  I  am  about  to  present  has  been  collected  during  a  five
months fieldwork conducted in 2014 in Semot11, a small French village of 300
people in the southern French Pyrenees. The fieldwork was part of my master
research project and focused on human-animal relations in the frames of
hunting and herding. The broader aim was that of placing Descola’s hypothe-
sis of naturalism in relation with data collected from a rural Western context.
Located at an altitude of 700 meters above sea level, Semot stands on a
rocky ridge overlooking the valley below in the Languedoc-Roussillon region
of France. Like many other villages in rural France, Semot has undergone
radical changes during the twentieth century (see Mendras 1967). In the time
span between 1900 and 1980, rural flights and the advent of modernisation
transformed this little Pyrenean village, whose lifestyle was characterised by
subsistence household-based agriculture and animal husbandry, in a quasi-
abandoned centre, straining to keep up with the national market economy12.
From the eighties onwards, the population started to timidly increase, due to
the arrival of foreign farmers attracted by the low prices of land and of new
country dwellers, namely urban residents who settled in the countryside in
the search of a lost bucolic paradise (Léger, Hervieu 1979). The village thus
became a quite variegated social  milieu, where local  old families, foreign
country-settlers and ex-urban dwellers live together. 
Nowadays, livestock farming is a rather common way of earning a living in
Semot, with thirteen farms present in the district. Most of them raise beef
cattle, with a few exceptions raising goats, pigs and poultry. Alongside herd-
11. All personal names and toponyms are pseudonyms. 
12. The village population dropped from almost 1000 inhabitants in 1900 to just  230 in
1975. 
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ing, hunting is another popular activity. Unlike seventy years ago, when all
the  hunters  were  villagers  and  hunted  mostly  small  game, contemporary
hunters come mostly from nearby villages and towns to hunt big game (wild
boar, deer, roe deer and Pyrenean chamois). Until the end of the fifties, hunt-
ing was considered a leisure activity that contributed to the population’s diet
as a subsidiary source of proteins, otherwise sporadically consumed. Today
most hunters do not eat their kills and they justify hunting as a pure sport or
as an activity of ecological management (cf. Fabiani 1982; Dalla Bernardina
1989). 
During  my  stay  in  the  village,  I  was  gradually  allowed  to  follow  the
hunters in their hunts and to help farmers in their daily work. Participating
in these activities slowly revealed the plurivocal and complex way in which
animals can be represented. 
Interiorities as mergers
Given that in naturalism the extent to which interiority discriminates be-
tween humans and animals is not entirely clear, I consider it relevant to start
my report by accounting for how “interiority” is distributed to animals by my
informants. 
Let us begin by saying that Descola defines interiority by a long list of at-
tributes: «the mind», «the soul», «intentionality», «subjectivity», «feelings»,
«the  ability  to  express  oneself  and  to  dream», «immaterial  principles  as-
sumed to cause animation», «the idea that I  share with the other a same
essence, a  same principle  of  action, a  same origin», «reflexive conscious-
ness», «the ability to signify», «mastery over symbols», «language» (Descola
2013: 116, 173-174). And let us continue by saying that in Semot certain ani-
mals were frequently endowed with some of these attributes. 
I was conducting my first interview with a local thirty-five years old goat
breeder, and I admit I was rather surprised to hear that, according to him, an-
imals had souls. Sitting in front of a crackling fireplace, I was asking him
what he thought happens to animals after they die: 
It’s like us, the death of an animal, they got their soul, it’s just the same, we all
have a soul, and after we die our soul goes away. I don’t know where, if it stays
here, if it goes in the afterlife… this I don’t know» (George, breeder of Semot).
Consider now this other testimony, excerpted from an interview with an
old retired local hunter: 
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Andrea Zuppi: You know, there are some who say that animals have a soul... 
Olivier: All animals do
A.Z.: They do?
Olivier: Of course. All animals do, all animals are very intelligent, but the most
intelligent among them is the human, and they know that, the animals, they re-
spect him
A.Z.: But what is the soul?
Olivier: It’s the intelligence.
The fact that “intelligence”, which Olivier calls the “soul”, is not listed by
Descola amongst the attributes of interiority is irrelevant. What matters is
that Olivier and George consider an immaterial quality (the soul or the “in-
telligence-soul”) to be not an aspect of rupture between humans and animals
but rather a common constitutive element. 
Notwithstanding some exceptions (to which I will return below), the idea
of  an immaterial  continuity  linking humans and animals  was  quite  com-
monly expressed by the hunters and breeders of Semot. Yet, the way in which
this continuity was articulated was rarely univocal, each individual not nec-
essarily endowing animals with the same intangible qualities and some of
these qualities being more frequently, or exclusively, granted to certain ani-
mals and not to others. The result is a composite panorama quite hard to
schematize. 
For instance, while beyond George and Olivier, only one more of the per-
sons I have met endowed animals with a soul, the idea that animals had a
memory  and  an  individuality  was  vastly  shared.  However,  memory  was
granted to many animals, like mammals, but denied to others, such as in-
sects and chickens. According to the breeders I have talked to, cows, but also
goats  and  sheep  possess  a  developed  geographical  and  acoustic  memory.
This allows them to exactly remember, even after several months, the paths
they  used  to  follow  in  the  mountain  pastures  and  to  recognize  familiar
voices: 
I do not think insects have a memory, but mammals do, for sure. Cows for ex-
ample,  they  memorize  my  voice,  they  know  me. They  especially  memorize
paths. If a cow goes away from a given place through a given path, it will come
back by the same way (breeder).
A chicken for me has no memory... I’m not even sure it remembers where the
food is, I think that every day it must look for where the food is, but the manger
doesn’t move you see […]. Cows are different. For example in the mountain,
cows are always going to follow the same path, that’s memory I think. That’s re-
ally something, if they’re going from a place to another, they will go there every
day, they will take the same path, all of them, all the cows will take the same
path, so that’s memory (breeder).
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Similarly, hunters agreed that wild animals tend to memorize and follow
the same paths and have a «very good knowledge of  their  territory». The
ways in  which certain animals  act  are interpreted as  the  outcome of  the
memory of previously lived experiences (thus not because of “sense of direc-
tion” or “habit”). Indeed, hunters insist on the importance of always killing
their preys. They know that if a wounded animal flees, it will not return to
the place where it was shot, as «it knows very well that it could be danger-
ous» (hunter). But the relation between previously lived events and present
acts can assume an even more “human-like” shape, such as in the following
case: 
A.Z.: Can animals remember? 
Aristide: If you caress them, if you hit a cow, they will remember, and then… like
a horse, a horse has even more memory than a cow. For example, there were
three stables down there, my parents had three stables, and one day a guy hit a
horse for nothing. Five years later, when it [the horse] had the possibility, it hit
the guy with both hoofs, badabam, it didn’t kill him, but the guy made it after a
while
A.Z.: So you think it was because…
Aristide: Yes, because he hit the horse for nothing. When you hit an animal that
deserves it, it’s like a kid, or someone who deserves it, he accepts it. But there, it
[the horse] must have held a grudge I think, it’s normal, it’s like humans, you
play a dirty trick on someone, you hold a grudge, if it can pay you back even if
it’s ten years later, it’ll do that.
An episode that to the eyes of someone else may simply be a stable acci-
dent (a horse kicking a human), is for Aristide, a local cow breeder in his six-
ties, a settling of accounts between two subjectivities: one human, the other
animal. From his point of view, animals, specifically horses, are not only en-
dowed with a memory, but also with self-consciousness and a kind of moral-
ity (which allows them to judge the fairness of received punishments) from
which springs, in this specific case, the desire of an “inter-specific revenge”. 
That some animals, such as cows, horses, donkeys, goats and dogs, have
their own subjectivity, which makes each specimen different from the others
by character, attitudes and feelings was a widely shared opinion in Semot.
According to some breeders, each cow in the herd recognises its name and
reacts to it when called. Cows are even said to be conscious of belonging to a
specific herd and not to another13. The attribution to animals of other quali-
13. In addition, all breeders agreed that cows, goats and sheep live in rigidly socially struc-
tured herds, in which different specimens have different roles. The awareness of this is of
paramount importance in the breeder’s work. For instance, cowbells are put on dominant
specimens, as they are those that lead the rest of the herd. It would therefore be wrong to
consider the breeder’s work as a series of actions executed on an undifferentiated series of
identical animals. In this respect, European and non-European breeders are not very differ-
ent (cf. Ravis-Giordani 1995; Stépanoff 2012). 
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ties, such as the ability to dream, was less unanimously shared, some people
generally granting it to cows, goats, sheep and dogs, while others restricting
it to just dogs, and sometimes not even to them: «I don’t know if dogs dream,
it’s  true sometimes you see a sleeping dog having some reactions… but I
don’t know if that’s a dream…» (hunter);
Dogs can dream, because you see them lying down running, but cows, I once
saw one… it was lying on a side like that, I thought it was dead, I looked closer
and it was not, I had the impression she was dreaming because it was doing like
that…it was strange, it was kicking and flapping, I said to myself “what’s going
on?” and when I touched it, the cow got up at once and stared at me with big
eyes, it was dreaming (breeder).
In addition to opening the doors for a discussion on local representations
of animal subjectivity and related intangible qualities, Aristide’s  anecdote
proves that the behaviours of certain animals can be interpreted by means of
the same causal principles taken into account for the interpretation of hu-
man behaviour. Namely, there seems to be a symmetry between the logic
that governs certain animal and human behaviours. 
Another evocative example of this symmetry is provided by Madame Roux,
a local cow and goat breeder. During our interview, she referred to an episode
in which one of her goats ventured out of the stable: “it was looking for me”,
said the breeder. It was a pregnant goat, which had to give birth in those
days. As the animal approached her, Madam Roux understood that it wanted
to be followed. The breeder was thus led to a corner of the stable, where the
goat showed her its newborn kid. According to Madame Roux, the goat sim-
ply «wanted to show me the baby, it wanted me to see it». 
Whether it was for resentment or for the joy of maternity, the animals we
are concerned with act by reason of some immaterial principles (completely
independently of their  “physicality”) that  would apply just  as well  to hu-
mans. Moreover,  this  last  story  also  demonstrates  that  animals,  at  least
goats, can be  considered  capable  of  socially  interacting  with  humans, by
communicating their moods to them. 
Interestingly, I found this communication of moods to be symmetric as
well. According to many of the breeders I have met, mammals are influenced
by human moods. For instance, if a breeder is nervous, animals too will get
nervous; if he is calm, animals will likely be calm as well. Therefore, part of
the work of the breeders consists in adopting a quiet and calm attitude, in or-
der to easily manage the animals. The following anecdote will serve as an ex-
ample. 
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One morning, I was helping two young farmers to retrieve two cows and
two calves that had joined the herd of another breeder. For several hours, the
two men had unsuccessfully tried to separate the four specimens from the
rest  of  the  herd  using  sheepdogs.  Terrorized  by  the  dogs,  the  herd  was
thrown in utter confusion, and ran tirelessly from one side of the pasture to
the other. After a few vain attempts of this kind, the two men decided to stop
and let the cows rest. One hour later, they approached the herd by walking
slowly, silently and with no dogs: without any difficulties they isolated the
four animals and took them away. The success of the operation was, as they
later commented, due to the calm attitude they adopted: «To work with ani-
mals one must be calm you see, if you are stressed or in a hurry nothing
works». 
This type of “communication of moods”, in which humans act on them-
selves to convey a sense of tranquillity to animals was “practiced” by many
breeders in Semot. As I was told: «they can feel, the animals, for sure, one
has to be calm, one must not rush, they feel it, they know very well, they are
not stupid…» (breeder). However, being calm is not a conditio sine qua non of
working with animals: «There are breeders who are brusque, rough, they [the
cows] get used to that... to being hit, everyone raises his animals as he wants,
but they feel it, the animals... » (breeder); 
[…] animals get used to everything, to everyone, they do like everyone else, they
get used to, they live with... stress, also they can be stressed, and there are
many breeders who are nervous, violent, their beasts get used to it but I think
they could be happier than they are, that’s all (shepherd).
In sum, animals can feel the breeder’s humoral attitude and are affected
by it. Arguably, it can be said that, since the behaviour of certain domestic
animals is not seen as dissociated from the behaviour of their owners, such
animals are, in a way, “socialised”14. Inserted as they are within social dy-
14. A cowherd named Gilbert, who worked with seven different herds, told me that he was
able to surmise the personality of the breeder just by looking at his cows. Similarly, a local
hunter, in answering a question I had asked him about the nature of animals, told me that
dogs are neither “good” nor “bad” by default, because «it all depends on how… if they are do-
mestic animals, on how they were raised, if the owner is bad, the animal will be bad, if the
owner is good, the animal will be good». Such socialisation of animals is obviously well at-
tested throughout Europe. For instance, the idea of a transmission of moods between hu-
mans and animals is for also found in French bullfighting, where an homology is drawn be-
tween the temperament and qualities of the bull and those of its owner (Saumade 1995: 38).
Anne-Marie Brisebarre (1998), for her part, describes the evocative case of the «moutons
meneurs» (the sheep leaders), namely sheep that, raised with baby bottles and responding to
their names, help the shepherd to direct the flock, playing the role of a mediator between
humans and animals (1998: 122-123; cf. Ravis-Giordani 1995; Tani 1996). 
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namics that partly determine them, it becomes hard to discern what is natu-
ral about them from what is social. They are what Bruno Latour would call a
«nature-culture» (1991)15. 
The extent to which some inhabitants of Semot granted some intangible
attributes of persons to animals, making them able to think, feel and act like
humans, should now be clear. This, however, does not mean that Semotans
were “animists”, insofar as I have not came across the idea, supposed to be
distinctive of animists people, that animals were persons homologues to hu-
mans16. Rather, and in a less schematic manner, the extension of interiority
to some animals in Semot indicates that it is possible to possess many key
qualities of human interiority without, for that reason, being considered a
person. Indeed, between being a person and not being one, many nuances
are possible (cf. Sigaut 1991; Sprenger 2016). 
In any case, not everyone in Semot was ready to endow animals with an
interiority. Some villagers seemed to be closer than others to Descola’s idea
of naturalism: 
Hunter: Animals don’t have any intelligence, they have an adaptation to the en-
vironment, but not an intelligence, I think animals have no intelligence, just an
adaptation that we have lost.
Author: What happens to the life of animals after they die?
Hunter: It goes in the pan, for me there’s no…there’s no spirit, there’s nothing.
Author: Do animals dream?
Breeder: I don’t think so...maybe...but to dream you must have a consciousness,
so do animals have that? I don’t think they do […], I don’t think they dream.
However, what I found more interesting was not the presence of those who
denied to animals the possession of intangible qualities, as the substantial
presence of some other people who admitted they ignored whether or not
animals had inner qualities: 
15. There is ground to argue that something similar happens with game animals. It has been
noted how wild boar driven hunt aims at «turning a harmless animal into a dangerous en-
tity» (Padiglione 1989: 155, my translation) in order to justify its killing. Thus, the animals
pursued in a driven hunt, are not animals «as they are» (Vincent 1987: 63), but animals
whose  behaviour  and  reactions  have  been  directly  spurred  by  human  actions.  This  is
strongly confirmed by Pelosse (1993), who, in analysing the practices of farming and reintro-
duction into the wild of game animals (wild boars and mouflons) in southern France, shows
how the “wildness” of these animals is aptly constructed by the hunters through a series of
zootechnical practices: as he eloquently declares, a game animal is an «artefact» (Pelosse
1993: 82). 
16. The classic view according to which animism is about generously extending humans
qualities to non-humans is today being fascinatingly questioned (see Praet 2014).
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Author: Do you think wild animals have feelings?
Hunter: Ah… maybe… I don’t know…what a question….
Author: Do you think game animals reincarnate?
Breeder: Oh... I don’t know... I never asked myself such questions...
Author: Do animals have a soul?
Breeder: A soul... uff... I don’t know... I’ve never thought about it...
The general picture is thus one in which some people endow animals with
an “interiority”, while some others do not, and yet some others say they do
not really know. In turn, each of these persons is likely to adapt his basic po-
sition  according  to  the  intangible  quality  in  question  and  to  the  animal
species17. The challenge then becomes one of how to deal with a variation of
this sort. 
In Beyond nature and culture, Descola envisaged the possibility that people
can «occasionally slip» in an ontology that is not their own (2013: 233-234).
For instance, a naturalist who speaks to his dog is only momentarily having
an animist intuition. It does not seem reasonable to reduce the presence of
conflicting viewpoints about the “interiority” of animals in Semot to a con-
vergence to, or a divergence from, a preconceived set of ideas on how ani-
mals should be represented by default18. 
In Semot, the opinions of those who consider “interiority” to be an ele-
ment of continuity between humans and animals are frequent and widely
shared. This fact alone prevents us from considering them as simple epiphe-
nomena of Descola’s supposed “naturalist” representation of animals. The
dynamics of distribution and retention of “interiority” to animals in Semot
unveil a situation of fundamental and irreducible ethnographic disorder: “in-
teriorities” can be mergers as well as breakups as well as unknown objects19. 
17. Even in the cases where interiority to animals was denied, such denial rarely concerned
all the intangible qualities of interiority. Thus, the same person would, for instance, negate
to animals the possession of consciousness and the capacity to dream, but allow to them the
possession of memory and of an intentionality. 
18. The position held by Descola creates in effect more problems than it solves. For instance
on which basis  shall  we consider  some events  or  enunciates, as  really  representative of
something and others as simple by-products? Probably conscious of these difficulties, De-
scola has, over the years, softened his positions, at least in reference to the naturalist ontol-
ogy: «[…] it is impossible for the moderns to schematize their relations with the diversity of
the things that exist by means of a single encompassing relationship» (Descola 2014a: 286,
my translation). 
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Physicalities as dividers 
Just as there is no unique way of detecting immaterial qualities in ani-
mals, there seems to be no unique way, in Semot, of looking at the material
aspects of animals. Various elements suggest that Semotans can identify at
least two different sides of “physicality”, one of which acts more as a dividing
factor between humans and animals rather than as a unifying one. 
Indeed, it has been noted how the notion of physicality proposed by De-
scola in  Beyond nature and culture is polysemic. The accurate and thorough
reading of Descola’s oeuvre proposed by Martin Fortier (2013) demonstrates
how physicality is a semantically unstable concept, due to a constant switch-
ing in the terms that define it (2013: 107-114). This switch specifically con-
cerns physicality in the animist and naturalist ontologies. 
Within naturalism, for instance, physicality is defined by a series of at-
tributes referring mainly to the material substance of things: «the physical
component of our humanity», «the molecular structure», «metabolism», «the
laws of  thermodynamics», «the laws of  chemistry», «the universal  laws of
matter», «the universal laws of life» (Descola 2013: 173-174). Instead, within
the animist ontology, physicality «consists in the form and the mode of life
that  it  prompts, far  more  than  in  substance»  (Descola  2013:  130), where
«form» is taken to be the «corporeal form» (Descola 2013: 131), and «mode of
life» the «ethogram» (amongst others), namely the ways of behaving enabled
by a specific corporeal form (Descola 2013: 137). 
The notion of physicality is thus split into two: on the one hand, the natu-
ralist physicality of material substance, on the other, the animist physicality
of  corporeal form and behaviour; on the one hand, a (naturalist) physicality
that unites, on the other, one (animist) that divides (Fortier 2013: 107-114)20.
19. The question of the underlying factors determining such a variation is indeed worth ask-
ing, even though the limited space at our disposal forbids us from coping with it exhaus-
tively. It is, in fact, a rather difficult question to answer given the absence of a factor, or a set
of factors, to which such variation can be ascribed. Elements such as age, degree of educa-
tion, gender, type of interaction with animals (e.g. hunting, herding), could not be taken as a
determinant of a specific way of attributing or denying an interiority to animals, given the
divergence of views found within the groups of persons associated by these criteria. In all
probability, the variation of representations is due to a concatenation of personal inclina-
tions and idiosyncrasies mixed with other social factors of the kind of those listed above.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the context of enunciation does not play a role in the variation
we are concerned with. Unfortunately, the extent to which this is the case is beyond reach of
my data. If I had to redesign this research from scratch, I would definitely put more empha-
sis on the ethnography of speech. 
20. As Fortier points out (2013: 107-117), the two physicalities do not refer to the same
thing and they cannot be considered as each other’s opposite. Therefore, the symmetric
inversion that should occur  between the properties  of  animism and those of  naturalism
seems, once again, to vacillate. 
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Now, the material I have collected indicates that these two ways of intending
physicality would not be mutually exclusive in Semot. Indeed, my informants
often gave considerable importance to the “animist physicality”21. Let us re-
volve to the ethnography in order to demonstrate this last point. 
The person in the picture (fig. 1) is called Gilbert. He is a seasonal cowherd
whose job is to look after seven herds of cattle that are left by their owners in
a  high  mountain  communal  pasture  during  the  summer  season. His  job
mainly consisted in making sure none of the cows would escape into neigh-
bouring territories. On a typical day, Gilbert walks the long of the pasture, up
and down the mountains, through high-plateaus and woods of conifers, tak-
ing note of all the cows he sees. It is a gruelling and wearying task, as the
herds usually split in small groups and the territory to monitor is extremely
vast. 
21. Descola  explicitly  admits  that  they  would  not  be  mutually  exclusive  in  the  animist
ontology  either,  because:  «[…]  the  idea  of  a  material  continuity  linking  all  organisms
together is common to most animist ontologies» (Descola 2013: 130). At this point, we really
strive  to  see  in  what  possible  ways  the  animist  and  naturalist  ontologies  conceived
“physicality” in opposite ways (cf. Fortier 2013: 117-118). 
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FIG 1: The seasonal cowherd Gilbert counting cattle. Photo by A. Zuppi.
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One day, Gilbert and I were looking for a group of seven calves. In his
opinion, they had escaped from the low temperatures of the communal pas-
tures  in  search  for  some  warmness  in  the  adjacent  properties  at  lower
heights. We were following the fenced limits of  the pasture in search for
some traces of the passage of the calves, not finding any. After a few hours,
Gilbert abandoned the hypothesis of the escape, and decided to look for the
calves elsewhere. As he explained to me, the weather probably was not cold
for a cow: «it depends on the weather, but one must be careful, because we
think in human, but this is not cold for a cow you see?». The search we were
conducting was calibrated on a human way of perceiving temperatures. How-
ever, as Gilbert told me, cows do not perceive the temperatures as human be-
ings do: what is cold for us may not be cold for them. Indeed, we later found
the calves  within the limits  of  the pasture:  they  had not  escaped to find
warmer weather. 
A similar anecdote concerns the Blanc, a couple of pig and cow breeders.
The Blanc own a herd of about thirty cows, as well as around fifty pigs, all
raised for meat. During our interview, they repeatedly mentioned the fact
that, in order to work with animals, one has to “think” like one of them. Ac-
cording to the Blanc, the central part of their job consists in “anticipating
things”, namely to foresee the reactions of the animals for better managing
the work. In order to do that, one has «to put himself in the place of the ani-
mal» (Mrs Blanc). As an example, they referred to the following story. Once,
they had to transfer a group of pigs from one enclosure to another. As usual,
they had opened the gates of the first enclosure to let the pigs out and push
them towards the new one through a fenced corridor. However, this time the
operation could not be completed. Regardless of how hard the Blanc tried,
physically pushing the animals, the pigs would not enter into the new enclo-
sure. Something was preventing the animals from moving forward, but the
Blanc could not understand what it was. They finally supposed it might have
been the grass, as it was taller then usual. In fact, after having cut it, the pigs
willingly entered inside the new area. The tall grass, Mrs Blanc argued, «was
like a wall for the pigs, they just couldn’t see beyond it». 
Both anecdotes testify a voluntary, temporary and partial suspension of
human judgment of things, during which Gilbert and the Blanc undertook
what we might call an exercise of imagination. They had to imagine what it
was like to be a cow, or a pig, in a given situation; imagine in which way a
given corporeal shape influences the visual or climate perception, and acted
accordingly. At the basis of all this, is likely to be the idea of a gap of physi-
cality, in the “animist” sense of the term, between humans and animals. Fur-
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thermore, there is the idea that the animal’s “physical point of view” may be,
albeit partially, seized, allowing humans to have a glimpse at how animals
(cows and pigs in these two cases) perceive things, or rather, as humans think
animals do.
Far from being reducible to the eccentricity of the three individuals con-
cerned, this imaginary projection “into the animal’s skin” is central to the
work of the breeder, as it is demonstrated by the analysis of some breeding
techniques implemented by European and non-European breeders alike (see
Angioni 1989: 22; Brisebarre 2013; Ferret 2013). 
Besides, more examples of a similar kind emerge from the ethnography of
hunting practices. The fact that Semotan hunters considered game animals’
sensory experiences, especially the modalities of smell, hearing and sight, to
be radically different from those of humans is certainly a trivial statement to
make, but it shows that differences at the level of physicality were clearly
perceived. 
In fact, not only were these differences perceived, but they were funda-
mentally constitutive of the venatic act. The hunter’s behaviour during the
hunt was induced (in varying degrees depending on whether it was a driven
hunt or a solitary hunt) by the prey’s sensory dispositions. 
Hunters agreed that  game animals smell  odours and hear sounds from
very far, their senses of hearing and smell being incredibly developed. These
two sensory modalities were considered the ones on which animals mainly
rely on, one hunter expressively speaking of animals having an «intelligence
du nez» (“intelligence of the nose”). 
These animal qualities have a strong impact on a hunter’s behaviour. The
most obvious one is the strict maintenance of silence during the hunt, as
game animals are capable of hearing small sounds from hundred of meters
away22. Additionally, hunters were not supposed to shave nor smoke before
going hunting, for animals can catch the scent of shaving cream and tobacco
from very far away (kilometres away with a favourable wind according to the
hunters). Likewise, it should be avoided to urinate or defecate whilst hunt-
ing, in order to prevent strong smells from revealing human presence. The
hunter’s conduct is thus moulded upon the sensory dispositions attributed
to game animals23. 
22. The  maintenance  of  silence  varies  according  to  the  types  of  hunting.  While  it  is
religiously observed by solitary hunters, it is less so in driven hunts.
23. Cf. Dalla Bernardina 2013; Hell 1985: 90-93 for similar observations as regards to Euro-
pean hunters, while refer to Gutierrez Choquevilca 2013 for comparison with non-European
ones. 
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In order to hide from the animals, hunters conceal those traits of their
“being human” that, from their point of view, are easily perceptible by ani-
mals. These attempts to hold certain aspects of their “humanity” back, to
“restrict” them (manifest in the sought-after maintenance of silence and the
need of being as odourless as possible), have the purpose of trying to fill a
perceived gap in the perceptive dispositions, made possible by  differently
equipped sensory organs, between humans and animals; a  de facto  gap in
physicality. This gap also concerned the sense of sight. Game animals were in
fact considered unable to recognize colours, as they have a black-and-white
vision. This allowed hunters to wear clothes such as those in fig. 2 (required
by  law), without  thinking  of  being  less  camouflaged:  their  bright  colour
would only strike the human eye, not the animal’s one.
The brief stories of the three breeders above, and the examples relating to
the conduct of the hunters, seem to go in the same direction. They demon-
strate that, in everyday practices and works with animals, “animist” physical-
ity (i.e. the ethogram) receives a great deal of attention. 
Although nobody in Semot would explicitly argue against the idea of a
material continuity linking humans and animals (the “naturalist” physicality
of material substance), it was the differences in behaviour and perceptions
enabled by a specific bodily apparatus that seemed to be more salient to the
hunters and breeders I have talked to. 
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FIG. 2. Hunting clothing. Source: http://www.kettner.fr (accessed on 10/10/2017).
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Conclusion
A more comprehensive and thorough analysis of the cases and facts ex-
posed in this article should integrate them within the wider social context
from which they have been isolated. However, the material that I have pre-
sented seems sufficiently indicative of the fact that in Semot, the distribu-
tion of “interiority” and “physicality” to animals does not  exactly comply
with the mechanisms envisaged by Descola for the naturalist ontology. 
The cases taken into account reveal how “interiority” would not be an ex-
ceptional human attribute, because it can be granted, in varying degrees, to
certain species of animals. “Physicality”, instead, is simultaneously intended
as the common denominator and as an element of division between humans
and animals. In sum, between the notion of naturalism and the ideas held
about animals in Semot there appears to be little reciprocity. 
To fully appreciate the implications of this fact (attested by well known
researchers also in non-rural settings24) for the model of naturalism, we must
take a step back, and tackle the question of  the wider significance of  the
quadripartite ontological system as a whole.
In the Epilogue of  Beyond nature and culture, Descola argues that one of
the main advantages of the system he has developed is that it offers the pos-
sibility to answer, in a comparative manner, wide and general questions such
as the following: «Why is there no totemic royalty? Why are nonhumans not
represented in parliaments on the grounds of their particular qualities? Why
does an Inca or a Pharaoh not eat his enemies? Why do Amerindian shamans
not make sacrifices?» (Descola 2013: 391). 
This «explicatory capacity» (Fortier 2013: 44) advocated by Descola, relies
on the aprioristic assumption according to which the four possible ways of
distributing interiority and physicality to the things that exist in the world
constitute the «ontological premises» (Descola 2014b: 277) which determine
many (if not all) types of social and cultural facts. For instance, the question
about the exclusion of non-humans from parliaments would find an answer,
in the naturalist ontology, in the supposed break between humans, consid-
ered persons and bearers of rights by virtue of their interiority, and non-hu-
mans, not considered as persons and deprived of rights because they lack an
interiority. 
24. See the contributions collected  by  Candea  and Alcayna-Stevens in a  volume of  The
Cambridge Journal of Anthropology (30, 2, 2012). 
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It is thus easy to grasp, and I get to the point, how the non-correspon-
dence between the naturalism model and ethnographic reality implies a ma-
jor decrease of the explicatory capacity of naturalism itself. Take this article.
What I have tried to demonstrate, through the ethnographic study of a spe-
cific topic, is that in a region associated with the naturalist ontology (south-
ern French Pyrenees), interiority does not entirely respect the distribution
patterns predicted by Descola and physicality is amply taken to be something
different than what Descola supposed. 
What this means is that the social and cultural phenomena taking place in
this specific region cannot be entirely determined by that specific system of
distribution of interiority and physicality which Descola identified as typical
of the naturalist ontology (continuity of physicalities and discontinuity of
interiorities).  The  inescapable  conclusion  is  that,  with  the  «ontological
premises» of naturalism failing, it is hard to consider the model of natural-
ism as an appropriate tool for ethnographic analysis. 
Now, to be fair, Descola has repeated until exhaustion that he conceives
his ontological structure to be a heuristic device for wider anthropological
comparison, not a tool for ethnographic analysis (e.g. Descola 2014b: 277;
2016: 325). However, the perspective from which this article was written is
one according to which anthropological theory is more of use if «it allows for
a clear account of  precise ethnographic materials» (Bonhomme 2016: 14),
rather than for more or less abstract schematisations whose capacity to re-
flect local processes is all but certain.
How  then  (to  engage  with  the  question  put  by  Candea  and  Alcayna-
Stevens) can naturalism be taken «seriously as an ethnographic object»? It
could be provocatively suggested that the only way to do so would be to in-
vert its epistemological status and convert it from being a resource of study
to being an object of study; from a theory to be exploited to an empirical ob-
ject to be explored. In sum, given the approximate degree of convergence
with empirical reality, one may wonder whether the inclusion of naturalism
amongst the research topics of an anthropology of knowledge like the one
developed by Barth (2000) or Stoczkowski (2008) constitutes the most fruitful
way to make use of such a model. 
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